From the platform’s registry
The page is built from the platform’s standards registry when the site is built. A status changes there first.
Every standard the protocol touches, the exact version implemented, what Zuger does with it and how it is checked.
Zuger Agent Protocol (ZAP) implements:
Built on open standards. Supported means implemented in Zuger’s library with the tests it names passing. In progress means partly implemented. Planned means nothing is implemented yet. Supported is about the code, not a running service: nothing here is live yet.
SUPPORTED
| Standard | Version implemented | What Zuger does with it | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| SD-JWT-based Verifiable Credentials (SD-JWT VC)IETF, OAuth working groupInternet-Draft | draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-19 | The format of Zuger's agent credentials (kya/agent/v0.1) and of outside agents' (kya/ext-agent/v0.1): issued and verified by the library. No credential is issued in production yet (milestone A3).Checked against Zuger's own tests.The kya-credential-profiles-0.1 vectors: both profiles issued, verified and refused case by case. | Supported |
| Selective Disclosure for JWTs (SD-JWT)IETF, OAuth working groupRFC, Proposed Standard | RFC 9901 | Selective disclosure inside the credentials: the principal and the approval are disclosed only when the holder chooses.Checked against the specification's own published examples.Disclosure digests from RFC 9901 §4.2.1 and §4.2.3, byte for byte. | Supported |
| HTTP Message SignaturesIETF, HTTP working groupRFC, Proposed Standard | RFC 9421 (Ed25519 only) | Proof of possession on each request an agent sends to a receiver that asked for it (label kya).Checked against the specification's own published examples.RFC 9421 Appendix B.2.6 and B.4: the published signature base and Ed25519 signature, byte for byte. | Supported |
| Digest Fields (Content-Digest)IETF, HTTP working groupRFC, Proposed Standard | RFC 9530 (sha-256, sha-512) | The body of a signed request, covered by its signature.Checked against the specification's own published examples.The Content-Digest values of RFC 9530 Appendix B and RFC 9421 B.2. | Supported |
| Ed25519 in JOSE (CFRG curves)IETFRFC, Proposed Standard | RFC 8037 (verify only: alg EdDSA with an Ed25519 key) | Accepted on verification for older libraries; Zuger signs with RFC 9864's Ed25519.Checked against the specification's own published examples.The EdDSA JWS of RFC 8037 Appendix A.4. | Supported |
| Fully-Specified Algorithms for JOSE and COSEIETF, JOSE working groupRFC, Proposed Standard | RFC 9864 (alg Ed25519) | The signature algorithm of every credential, status list, statement and log note Zuger signs.Checked against the specification's own published examples.RFC 8037 Appendix A.4's key and payload signed under alg Ed25519 give the published signature. | Supported |
| JSON Web Key (JWK) ThumbprintIETFRFC, Proposed Standard | RFC 7638 (OKP keys) | The key id (keyid) of an agent's key in its signatures.Checked against the specification's own published examples.The Ed25519 thumbprint of RFC 8037 Appendix A.3. | Supported |
| Token Status ListIETF, OAuth working groupInternet-Draft, in the RFC Editor queue | draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-21 | Revocation of Zuger's credentials: one bit per credential, checked by every verifier.Checked against the specification's own published examples.The draft's 1-bit and 2-bit examples and its Appendix C lists, byte for byte. | Supported |
| OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange: the actor claimIETF, OAuth working groupRFC, Proposed Standard | RFC 8693 §4.1 (the act claim only; no token exchange endpoint) | The delegation chain person → company → agent in every delegation statement.Checked against Zuger's own tests.The nesting of act claims as §4.1 orders it. | Supported |
| did:webW3C Credentials Community GroupCommunity Group draft (not a W3C Recommendation) | did:web Method Specification, Community Group draft as read on 2026-10-23 | Identifiers of the issuer and of agents, resolved to their DID documents.Checked against the specification's own published examples.The method's own examples (a port as %3A, path segments joined with colons) and documents read back for the DID asked for only. | Supported |
| did:keyW3C Credentials Community GroupCommunity Group draft (not a W3C Recommendation) | did:key Method v0.7 (Ed25519 only) | Agent identifiers in the KYA-OS adapter, resolved locally.Checked against another implementation's published test data.KYA-OS's published did:key derivation, and malformed keys refused. | Supported |
| JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)IETF (Independent Submission)RFC, Informational | RFC 8785 | The exact bytes a KYA-OS signature or hash covers.Checked against the specification's own published examples.RFC 8785's sample and its Appendix B number samples, byte for byte. | Supported |
| StatusList2021 and Bitstring Status ListW3CW3C Recommendation (Bitstring Status List); StatusList2021 is its earlier community draft | Bitstring Status List v1.0, and StatusList2021 lists as KYA-OS reads them | Revocation of KYA-OS delegation credentials in the KYA-OS adapter (Zuger's own credentials use the Token Status List).Checked against Zuger's own tests.Bits read most significant first after GZIP, and the list's own proof checked before any bit. | Supported |
| Certificate Transparency Version 2.0: the Merkle treeIETFRFC, Experimental | RFC 9162 §2.1 (the Merkle tree, inclusion and consistency proofs) | The transparency log's tree and its proofs.Checked against another implementation's published test data.transparency-dev/merkle's published probes, and every tree size from 1 to 64 against the reference. | Supported |
| Signed notesC2SPC2SP specification | signed-note v1 (Ed25519, signature type 0x01) | The log's checkpoints and its signed promises.Checked against the specification's own published examples.The specification's example note and the Go reference's signing examples, byte for byte. | Supported |
| Transparency log checkpointsC2SPC2SP specification | tlog-checkpoint v1 | The signed tree head of the transparency log.Checked against the specification's own published examples.The specification's example, and a real checkpoint of the Go checksum database opened with the key Go trusts. | Supported |
| Transparency log cosignaturesC2SPC2SP specification | tlog-cosignature v1 (Ed25519, signature type 0x04; ML-DSA-44 not implemented) | Witnesses' cosignatures on the log's checkpoints, checked and counted.Checked against the specification's own published examples.The specification's example message, and real witnesses' published cosignatures. | Supported |
| Web Bot Auth: verifying signed agent requestsIETF, webbotauth working groupInternet-Drafts | draft-ietf-webbotauth-httpsig-protocol-00 and draft-meunier-webbotauth-httpsig-directory-00 | Other agents' signed requests verified by verifyAny(), named by their key directory. It grants nothing.Checked against the specification's own published examples.The draft's Appendix E Ed25519 vectors verify, and every tampered one is refused. | Supported |
| KYAPay tokens (identity only)IETF Internet-Drafts by SkyfireIndividual Internet-Drafts | draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-02 and draft-skyfire-kyapayprofile-02 | Read for the agent's identity only. A payment token never grants a payment, a deal or a paid job.Checked against the specification's own published examples.The drafts' three token types verify for identity; tampered and forged tokens are refused. | Supported |
| Agent Payments Protocol (AP2) mandates (shown only)Google (vendor specification)Vendor specification | v0.2, commit e1ea56d (2026-04-29) | Mandates read and shown, never acted on: no amount, payee or constraint is approved or paid.Checked against the specification's own published examples.The specification's published encoded mandates read, and tampered ones are refused. | Supported |
| kya-handshake/0.1ZugerZuger's open specification | kya-handshake/0.1 | Two agents prove themselves to each other in three messages and agree a session, over HTTPS and A2A.Checked against Zuger's own tests.The published kya-handshake-0.1 vectors: one for every result code. | Supported |
| chain/0.1 (the Zuger Agent Chain)ZugerZuger's open specification | chain/0.1 | Signed steps from a person's decision to what the agents did for them.Checked against Zuger's own tests.The published kya-chain-0.1 vectors: one for every result code. | Supported |
IN PROGRESS
| Standard | Version implemented | What Zuger does with it | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Transparency log witness protocolC2SPC2SP specification | tlog-witness add-checkpoint, as read for milestone C1 on 2026-10-27 | Sending each new checkpoint to the log's witnesses and keeping their cosignatures.Checked against Zuger's own tests.The client against a stand-in witness: each checkpoint sent with a consistency proof, and a conflict followed.Waits for: No outside witness cosigns the log yet: choosing three is an owner step (P35). | In progress |
| Web Bot Auth: signing Zuger's own fetchesIETF, webbotauth working groupInternet-Drafts | draft-ietf-webbotauth-httpsig-protocol-00 and draft-meunier-webbotauth-httpsig-directory-00 | The knowledge crawler signs its fetches of a company's own website, with the key published in a directory (P24).Checked against Zuger's own tests.The signing helper's requests verify, and a replay or a changed body does not.Waits for: The crawler does not sign yet: it needs its own key and the public key directory (milestone E2). | In progress |
| KYA-OS CoreKYA-OS project (decentralized-identity/kya-os-mcp)Open specification with a conformance suite | Specification 1.0.0, conformance suite 1.2.0 (commit 5a7412a6) | An adapter beside Zuger's own credential: did:key, JCS, delegation credentials and the MCP session.Checked against another implementation's published test data.KYA-OS's own conformance vectors, vendored byte for byte, run through Zuger's adapter.Waits for: A conformance claim is made only once a result is submitted (P21); the MCP middleware is a later step. | In progress |
PLANNED
| Standard | Version implemented | What Zuger does with it | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)IETFRFC, Proposed Standard | None | Timestamps from outside providers over the log's checkpoints (P36).Waits for: Two timestamp providers chosen (an owner step) and a token reader; the chain checks a timestamp only through a reader it is given. | Planned |
| OpenID for Verifiable Credential IssuanceOpenID FoundationFinal specification | None | Issuing credentials to outside agents' wallets, by a pre-authorised code flow bound to the developer's passkey session (review 01-10).Waits for: The issuer (milestone A3) first: no credential is issued yet. | Planned |
| OpenID for Verifiable PresentationsOpenID FoundationFinal specification | None | Presenting an agent's credential to a site that asks, for "Sign in with Zuger".Waits for: Sign in with Zuger (milestone G2). | Planned |
| A2A Agent CardsAgent2Agent (A2A) projectOpen protocol specification | None | Directory entries for registered agents.Waits for: The directory (milestone D1). | Planned |
HOW THIS PAGE IS MADE
The page is built from the platform’s standards registry when the site is built. A status changes there first.
Each version was last checked against its publisher’s page on 2026-10-28.
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